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Abstract
The discussion paper discusses the macroeconomic argument of a New Economy that is
characterized by higher non-inflationary economic growth due to increases in produc-
tivity caused by the digital revolution. Besides presenting evidence put forward by
mainstream protagonists of the New Economy, it explores an interpretation of the New
Economy inspired by regulation theory. Specifically, it looks at the stability of a finance-
led regime of accumulation on the basis of the digital production paradigm. Some basic
causal relationships of such a regime, especially the investment-profits, wealth-profits,
and wealth-consumption connections, seem too fragile to be able to support the asser-
tion that a stable new regime of accumulation has emerged. Furthermore, the New
Economy thesis suffers from serious problems in measuring productivity in the service
industries. Therefore, it seems just as plausible that the long “Clinton” expansion was a
singular event made possible by the special position the U.S. enjoys in the world econ-
omy.
Zusammenfassung
Wie stimmig ist das makroökonomische Argument von einer New Economy: Ist höheres
inflationsneutrales Wirtschaftswachstum aufgrund gestiegener, der digitalen Revolution
geschuldeten Produktivitätszuwächse möglich geworden? Zur Beantwortung dieser Fra-
ge werden zunächst die von den Mainstream Befürwortern angeführten Belege präsen-
tiert. So dann wird eine Interpretation aus regulationstheoretischer Perspektive versucht,
wobei insbesondere die Stabilität eines finanzgetriebenes Wachstumsmodells auf der
Basis eines digitalen Produktionsregimes ausgelotet wird. Einige fundamentale Kausal-
zusammenhänge eines solchen Modells, wie der Investitionen-Gewinn-Nexus, Vermö-
gen-Gewinn-Nexus und Vermögen-Konsum-Nexus, sind zu fragil, um von einem neuen
stabilen Akkumulationsregime sprechen zu können. Ferner steht der Kern der New-
Economy-These, die informationstechnologisch bedingten Produktivitätszuwächse,
noch auf unsicherem Datenfundament. Deshalb erscheint eine Interpretation des langan-
haltenden Wirtschaftsaufschwunges in den USA als singuläres, durch die besondere
Position der USA in der Weltwirtschaft begünstigtes Ereignis ebenso plausibel zu sein.
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Introduction
The term “new economy” is as enigmatic as that of “modernism”. My first encounter
with the construct was in an essay by Kim Moody (1994/1997), in which he used “new
economy” for labeling deregulation, lean production, and above all a workforce whose
composition has shifted in ethnicity and gender. The term entered the mainstream at the
heels of a speech made by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan,
before the U.S. Congress in July 1996 (Greenspan 1996). In this speech, Greenspan de-
fended his position to forego interest rate hikes despite low unemployment by pointing
to the high growth in productivity, which would prevent employment-induced price in-
creases. He countered the assumption widely held since the 1980s that price stability is
endangered when the unemployment rate falls under 6% (NAIRU = non-accelerating
inflation rate of unemployment): Price stability could be maintained even at a far lower
rate of joblessness. Greenspan argued that because this situation is new, it is warranted
to speak of a new economy. The chief reason for the productivity gains is to be found
not in tighter international competition but above all in advances within the realm of
information technology:
“Our nation has been experiencing a higher growth rate of productivity – output per
hour worked – in recent years. The dramatic improvement in computing power and
communication and information technology appear to have been a major force behind
this beneficial trend” (Greenspan 1998)
The term “new economy” has many connotations (Ehrke 2000). Most commonly it re-
fers to that branch of the economy that develops, produces, and applies Internet-based
information technologies (the so-called Internet economy; see Zerdick et al. 1999). In
the following discussion concerning theoretical perspectives on the new economy phe-
nomenon, I orient myself on Greenspan’s macroeconomic usage of the term. The main
characteristic of the new economy is that high productivity growth (thanks to the new
economy in a micro-economic sense) sustains high non-inflationary economic growth
(cf. Bassanini et al. 2000). This article examines the validity of this theory.1
First, I present the evidence usually cited in support of Greenspan’s theory of a new
economy. Second, I outline the arguments of the skeptics who relativize the alleged pro-
ductivity gains. Then I provide a theoretical explanation for Greenspan’s theory that
originates in a comfortable distance from the new economy lobbyists (e.g., the Clinton
administration, the Federal Reserve Board, and Wall Street); namely, French regulation
theory.2 In conclusion, I discuss the problems associated with the empirical basis for
such an interpretation and point to some developments that indicate the transient and
singular nature of the recent extraordinarily long expansion of the U.S. economy.
                                                
1 I deal only marginally with the employment-side of the sustained U.S. expansion. For a comprehen-
sive, interdisciplinary analysis of the so-called job miracle, see Lang et al. (1999).
2 Seminal works of this French social theory include those by Michel Aglietta (1979, 2000), Robert
Boyer (1990), and Alain Lipietz (1985). For an introduction to this work, see Boyer (2000a).
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The Political Background of the New Economy
In Germany, the term “new economy” entered the political vocabulary simultaneously
with “shareholder capitalism” – in the wake of discussions concerning the so-called
American job miracle. Consequently, the term was seen as the battle cry of a triumphant
capitalism (see the critique in Altvater and Mahnkopf 2000). It carries the same trium-
phal undertones in the United States, which overshadows the fact that the term was ini-
tially used in the 1996 election year to justify the growth-promoting interest rate policy
of the Federal Reserve. After the Federal Reserve upped interest rates from 3% to 6%
from early 1994 to the spring of 1995, President Clinton feared suffering a similar fate
as that of his predecessor; namely, to fall victim to a slowdown in the economy caused
not least by interest rate policy. In 1995 some economists and bankers allied with the
Democratic Party (notably New York investment banker Felix Rohatyn [1995]) – but
also a few industrialists – came out in favor of a change in interest rate policy (Wood-
ward 2000: 150). Their argument that a higher, non-inflationary growth rate would be
sustainable owing to the new communication technologies and the success of “lean
management” was met with enthusiasm by President Clinton. But interest rate policy-
making was the domain of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which was
dominated by Chairman Alan Greenspan. This market-economy-oriented Republican,
who under President Ford was president of the Council of Economic Advisors, aston-
ished everyone by adopting the new economy argument. From mid-1995, the FOMC
quickly cut the interest rate to 5¼ percent, where it remained for the entire 1996 election
year. Thus Greenspan not only helped re-elect Bill Clinton, he also created the frame-
work for America’s poor to find jobs and income. Because, with a Republican majority
in both houses of Congress, President Clinton had no chance of fighting poverty with a
redistribution policy. Accelerated economic growth alone offered the prospect of help-
ing the jobless among the traditional Democratic base. Thus it is hardly surprising that
progressive economists like Barry Bluestone (1999) and Robert Eisner (1998) have
euphorically embraced the new economy argument, whereas NAIRU followers like
Robert Gordon have taken a more skeptical stance (see below).
The New Economy Theory
The gist of the new economy theory is that a higher, non-inflationary growth trend has
emerged in recent years owing to higher productivity gains driven particularly by infor-
mation technology. As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan puts it:
“It’s certainly become increasingly difficult to deny that something profoundly dif-
ferent from typical post war business cycle has emerged in recent years. … Most re-
markably, inflation has remained subdued in the face of labor markets tighter than we
experienced in at least a generation… While there are various competing explana-
tions …, the most compelling appears to be the extraordinary surge in technological
innovation … In the early 1990s, …, those innovations began to offer sharply higher
prospective returns on investment than had prevailed in earlier decades … By 1995,
the investment boom had gathered momentum, suggesting that earlier expectations of
elevated profitability had not been disappointed … Now, five years later, there can be
little doubt that … the [productivity] growth rate has continued to rise with scant evi-
dence that it is about to crest.” (Greenspan 2000: 2)
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Fig. 2: Rate of Inflation During Expansions
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Fig. 3: Growth of Real Profits During Expansions
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Fig. 4: Growth of Real Hourly Compensation During Expansions
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The theory was apparently substantiated by the unusual business cycle of the U.S. econ-
omy. As illustrated in Figures 1-4, the economic resurgence Clinton presided over in his
fifth year in office is distinctive from previous ones in that productivity continued to
rise, inflation fell, profits declined slightly, and real wages climbed.
One of the reasons for the extraordinary productivity bonanza in a late phase of cyclical
upturn was the rapid growth of information technology investments, especially invest-
ments in data processing equipment. The ratio of the capital stock of computer hardware
to hours worked rose an average of 16.3% per annum from 1991 to 1995, accelerating to
33.7% from 1996 to 1999. The use of software capital also surged, if not quite so dra-
matically. All other forms of capital stock, which account for 95% of the entire U.S.
capital stock, exhibited in the 1990s an annual growth of a mere 0.5% (see figure 5).
Fig. 5: Growth in Nonfarm Business Sector Output per Hour During Expansions
Percent change at annual rate
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A study by Oliner and Sichel revealed that computer capital outlays from 1996 to 1999
contributed up to 24% of the general growth in labor productivity. This is all the more
astounding when one considers that in 1998 computers accounted for less than 1% of
total capital stock (Oliner/Sichel 1999/2000). On the whole, the increased use of IT
capital (computers, software, and communication equipment) in the second half of the
1990s accounted for 48-74% (depending on the study) of the acceleration in productivity
gains of 1.06 percentage points (DOC 2000: 38).
Barry Bluestone vividly and critically describes how the mainstream of U.S. economists
have come to grips with this sustained economic revival. Inflation plays a key role in
this explanation. If price rises are imminent, investors demand higher interest rates to
compensate for the expected loss of purchasing power. By the same token, uncertainty
about prospective inflation trends inhibits investment activities. Without knowledge
about future prices, firms cannot adequately plan future levels of production. They will
avoid making long-term investments for fear of generating excess capacities and inven-
tories.
Bluestone summarized the individual components of the neoclassical growth model as a
syllogism:
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(A) Economic growth can only be accelerated by higher investments.
(B) Higher investments require lower interest rates.
(C) Lower interest rates require stable prices and increased savings.
(D) Only when inflationary trends are strictly under control and a high savings rate is
achieved can economic growth be quickened.
Yet this line of reasoning leaves a key question unanswered; namely, that of demand. If
production volume continually balloons due to new investments, but demand for addi-
tional goods and services is inadequate, then productivity gains would only increase
unemployment and lead to an underutilization of production capacities.
This gap in the argument is filled in mainstream economic thinking by what Bluestone
calls the “Wall Street Virtuous Cycle,” which is based on the assumption that inflation
fighting gives the impression of capital market stability, which itself is conducive to
higher equity prices. These higher equity prices increase household wealth and encour-
age greater spending. In this manner demand is created for the additional production
volumes stimulated by the new investments. Thus the growth curve reaches ever higher
levels.
In retrospect – Bluestone wrote in 1999 – this model appears to have functioned pre-
cisely as expected. The Dow Jones 30 Industrials rose from less than 3,800 in 1994 to
over 9,000 in the summer of 1998. This market strength increased household wealth by
12 trillion U.S. dollars within just four years. Yet only a very small portion of these
gains was spent on goods and services. But even if this portion were no larger than 4%,
annual consumer spending would rise by 120 billion U.S. dollars. Hence spending
would increase by 2.1% annually. Again, in the words of Alan Greenspan:
“... our economy is still enjoying a virtuous cycle, in which, in the context of subdued
inflation and generally supportive credit conditions, rising equity values are provid-
ing impetus for spending and, in turn, the expansion of output, employment, and pro-
ductivity-enhancing capital investment.” (Greenspan 1998)
Bluestone’s critique commences with the individual components of the neoclassical
syllogism. His skepticism was borne out concerning the ever increasing equity prices in
the 2000 stock market year. Nevertheless, Bluestone’s interpretation of the unusual
business cycle of the U.S. economy differs from the neoclassical explanation primarily
in the emphasis he places on the contribution the IT revolution has made toward build-
ing up the confidence of private investors. In this respect he finds himself in league with
Greenspan.
Despite the impressive boom of recent years, not all economists subscribe to the new
economy theory. First, to some macroeconomists, the higher productivity gains are the
consequence of high economic growth (Solow, quoted in Uchitelle 2000a) stemming
from a growth-promoting monetary policy (see below).
Second, the recent reversal of the long-term productivity trend is either fully disputed or
interpreted as a short-term anomaly. The rise in the average productivity rate of 2.15%
per annum from the fourth quarter of 1995 to the first quarter of 1999 was, as Robert
Gordon pointed out (1999a), still below the average growth rate of 2.63% in the interval
from 1952 to 1972. However, over the course of 1999, the average rate of productivity
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rose to 2.82% (from the fourth quarter of 1995 to the first quarter of 1999; Gordon
2000: Table 2).3
Surmounting the Computer Paradox?
To the skeptics, Robert Solow’s dictum rings true: “You can see the computer age eve-
rywhere but in the productivity statistics” (1987: 36). Until recently, there was consen-
sus among productivity experts that information technologies would give rise to a pro-
ductivity paradox. These technologies have undergone breathtaking innovation in per-
formance and manufacturing productivity, and since the early 1980s they have diffused
like wildfire. Yet IT use has not left its mark in macroeconomic productivity statistics
(Blinder/Quandt 1997). In 2000, leading productivity experts like Dale Jorgenson and
Kevin Stiroh cautioned against jumping to conclusions:
“The apparent combination of slow productivity growth and heavy computer-use [in
specific service industries] remains an important obstacle for new economy propo-
nents who argue that the use of information technology is fundamentally changing
business practices and raising productivity throughout the U.S. economy.” (Jorgen-
son/Stiroh 2000: 37)
Moreover, these authors find it implausible that the relatively small IT sector (see
above) could engender productivity gains in the economy at large. According to Robert
Gordon’s calculations, high productivity growth is confined primarily to the IT sector;
namely, 41.7% per annum from the fourth quarter of 1995 to the first quarter of 1999.
The productivity growth rate for investment goods and durable goods excluding com-
puters was only 1.8% for the same interval; it was a mere 1.5% for the large remainder
of the economy (nonfarm, nondurables private business sector; Gordon 1999a: Table 1).
Because this “remainder” invested heavily in computer technology, Gordon believes the
productivity paradox remains intact but is by no means inexplicable. First, he contends
that the invention of the computer and the Internet was far less significant than the mile-
stone inventions of the second industrial revolution from 1860 to 1900 (electricity, in-
ternal combustion engine, communication media, etc.). The computer does not create
new needs but rather is a slave to rationalization. Nevertheless, in many fields the com-
puter cannot replace manpower, especially where personal contact is still important. The
demand for computers increases only because of falling prices (constant demand curve).
Even in the Internet age, this demand did not expand commensurate with the nose dive
in prices. The computer revolution thus has only limited merit as an engine of macro-
economic growth (Gordon 2000: 24-28).
Second, Gordon is skeptical that the computer revolution can claim spillover effects.
Outside the manufacturing industry, the Internet itself would make only a small contri-
bution to productivity gains. Gordon gives five reasons for this:
                                                
3 Productivity data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in September 2000, based on the
revised National Income and Product Accounts, reveals an annual productivity growth rate of
2.5% in the private sector for the interval 1995 - 1998 (per manhour), and an increase of 3.3%
for the interval 1948 - 1973 (BLS Multifactor Productivity Trends, 1998).
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1. Internet use merely replaces other forms of entertainment and information gathering.
2. The Internet does not increase spending but comes solely at the expense of tradi-
tional sales methods. Thus investment in the Internet is the first line of market share
defence.
3. Frequently the content of the Internet is not really new but has simply become more
readily and cheaply accessible.
4. Many Websites duplicate rather than replace traditional forms of conveying infor-
mation, so that costs often exceed sales.
5. Internet use takes place mostly during working hours at the expense of firms
(Gordon 2000: 6).
Robert Gordon does not deny that in the 1990s the unemployment rate could be reduced
without igniting inflation, thus paving the way for higher economic growth. However, in
his eyes the NAIRU’s decline was primarily fueled by the changed behavior of prices
for foodstuffs and energy as well as plunging import prices vis-à-vis the previous dec-
ade. Only in second place does Gordon cite plummeting computer prices, a slowdown of
price rises in the healthcare sector (thanks to cuts in fringe benefits), and a modified
measure of price inflation (Gordon 1999b).
The New Economy from a Regulation Theory Perspective
The new economy theory is not only promulgated by interested parties, be it the Clinton
administration or investment banks on Wall Street, but has proponents among economic
historians like Paul David and social theorists in the Neomarxist tradition like Manuel
Castells,4 and – though rather implicitly – by prominent authors of the French regulation
school (Aglietta 2000; Boyer 2000b).
The latter group resolves the IT productivity paradox by making a case for a presently
emerging “new production paradigm”. Their argument goes as follows. Production
based on technologies powered by cheap energy is being supplanted by a production
paradigm based on cheap information. This shift has come about through the IT revolu-
tion. The common denominator underlying the most diverse technological innovations
of the last few decades is a common digital language for acquiring, saving, and trans-
mitting information. The digitalization of information facilitates the possibilities of ex-
change between separate branches of research, thus accelerating knowledge dissemina-
tion. Nevertheless, the rewards of technological development cannot be immediately
reaped at the macroeconomic level. Analogous to technological advances in the past
(e.g., invention and diffusion of the electric motor; David/Wright 1999), a long learning
phase for each new technology is to be expected. The breakthrough for the widespread
application of electronic data processing happened in 1971 with the invention of the
microprocessor. Its utilization nonetheless was accompanied by high training costs and
necessitated an overhaul of the organizational structure. Michael Kiley estimates that
                                                
4 Manuel Castells’s definition of the new economy places more emphasis on its production side than on
its macroeconomic dimension. To him, the new economy is “informational, global, and networked”.
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these adjustment costs have lowered measured growth in multifactor productivity since
1974 by about ½ percentage point (Kiley 1999). Studies on the introduction of elec-
tronic data processing in businesses showed that productivity gains were made only
when the business had previously undergone the appropriate restructuring (Brynjolfsson/
Hitt 1998; Black/Lynch 1999). Optimal use of the computer first came about with the
introduction of the Internet (Castells 2000: 51-53). One’s personal experience with
computer use in academia should readily confirm this argument.
The fact that electronic data processing only realizes its full potential over time is just
one factor behind the unexpectedly disappointing productivity trend in the 1980s. The
replacement of the old paradigm with the new is arguably of greater importance. If one
follows regulation theory in the assumption that the productivity reserves of the old
paradigm were exhausted by the mid-1970s at the latest (Aglietta 1979: 119-121), then
the low productivity gains in the 1980s and early 1990s were practically inevitable. Be-
cause as long as the new paradigm was implemented in only a few sectors and the
hoped-for effect was evident in still fewer sectors, then the declining efficiency of the
old regime would affect the macroeconomic productivity trend (David 1999: 29).
Yet regulation theory states that a new production paradigm cannot realize its full po-
tential as long as it is not incorporated in a compatible regime of accumulation regime
and a suitable mode of regulation (Aglietta 1979). In the following – by way of a
thought experiment – I outline a model for a new economy accumulation regime that is
based on the information technology production paradigm and borrows from Robert
Boyer’s draft of an ideal prototype of a “finance-led” growth model (2000b). This model
will be illustrated using examples from the United States.
Contrary to the Fordist accumulation regime, where investments are driven primarily by
spending, in the new economy they would be spurred by the expected gains in efficiency
as well as innovation and monopoly rents from utilizing technological innovations.
First, sufficient consumer demand is secured by the job-creating multiplier effects of
investments. Second, in contrast to Fordism, the level of real wages would be main-
tained, not by adjusting nominal wages to productivity growth, but rather primarily by
implementing price cuts. In the pre-Fordist period, such a strategy hindered the integra-
tion of workers in the capitalistic world of consumption. Before the Great Depression, it
mattered little how low the prices were for key consumer products such as the automo-
bile and the family home. Absolutely they remained so expensive that workers could not
finance them out of their earnings. Workers had moreover little chance of obtaining
loans due to their uncertain income. Today in the OECD countries, social security is still
quite extensive despite the restructuring of the welfare state, so that comparatively
speaking the income flows of workers are constant (with the exception of those affected
by the U.S. welfare reform; Piven 1999, Hay 2001). This is one reason why loans (and
credit cards) are easily available to most workers. Furthermore, imports from countries
with a much lower wage level put a cap on prices for basic consumer goods, which has
important implications for satisfying the consumer needs of workers in the lower wage
brackets. Nevertheless, high productivity gains do allow non-inflationary nominal wage
increases, as was evidenced over the last three years in the United States (see Figure 4;
from 1995 to 1998, real hourly wages rose by an average of 1.9% per annum, with the
lower wage brackets exhibiting markedly higher gains, attributable in part to an increase
in the minimum wage; Mishel et al. 2000: 115, 124). Third, profit-induced gains in
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wealth create a climate conducive to spending. Rising property and equity prices would
encourage higher consumer spending (comparable with the argument made in the Wall
Street Virtuous Cycle; see above).
The wage relation in the new economy would be largely regulated by market forces.
Given a state-prescribed minimum wage level and social security benefits, the price and
quantity of manpower would be adjusted to supply and demand. The resultant greater
income inequality would stimulate employment. Low wages would allow less produc-
tive economic activities to be sustained and enable better paid workers to avail them-
selves of housekeeping services on the market (Häußermann 1999). For these reasons, a
lull in demand is unlikely despite rising income disparities. Furthermore, an ever greater
portion of remuneration is profit based, be it in the form of bonus payments or stock
options. In addition, provisions for retirement pensions are increasingly capitalized, ei-
ther as private pension plans or as company pension funds, which can invest their mon-
ies in capital markets. Workers therefore have a stake in the profits and in the concomi-
tant asset price increases. Because investments are greatly contingent on profits in this
model, through wage restraint workers can favorably influence profits and hence em-
ployment level and at the same time improve their net asset position (Boyer 2000b:
124). They would also have a direct incentive to work more productively.
Extensively deregulated, globalized markets would offer a guarantee against inflationary
trends and lead to a rapid, innovation-boosting re-allocation of resources. Capital mar-
kets in particular would react quicker to the new demand, thereby stimulating innovation
and preventing structural conservatism. Instead of self-financing and bank loans, listed
stocks and venture capital would be the dominant financing methods. This would have
the added advantage of stabilizing demand, because rising equity prices lead to higher
consumer spending. Monetary policy alone would, as in Fordism, remain in the hands of
the state, at least in the leading industrial countries.
Uncertain Causalities in the New Economy Model
Akin to the neoclassical syllogism, this new economy model inspired by regulation the-
ory seems at first glance to be able to plausibly explain the dynamic economic growth of
the United States in recent years. A regulation theoretical interpretation, however, also
implies probing for frictions among the various forms of regulation. Michel Aglietta
(2000) and Robert Boyer (2000b) have expressed grave skepticism about the models
stability because of the highly cyclical nature of the financial dynamic. In the following,
I will probe the assumed causality in three relationships of the new economy model.
The investment-profit nexus: The model assumes that investments in machinery and
equipment for the new production paradigm would increase both productivity and prof-
its. Productivity gains allow higher economic growth and the prospects of profit spur
investment. However, the realization of these expected profits cannot always be assured
for a number of reasons. First, as its name suggests, the new economy moves at the fore
of technological innovation. Thus the success of a given technology is shrouded in un-
certainty. Investment failure is almost inevitable (Leonhardt 2000). Additionally, there is
a systematic reason why bad investments can take on vast proportions in the new econ-
omy production paradigm. Since the new production paradigm is characterized not least
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by network externalities, firms are tempted by extra profits to set the standard in their
respective network. The struggle for network control will lead to over investment. A
classic case represent the rail roads in the late 19th century. In trying to build the most
comprehensive network, they laid ultimately unsustainable parallel tracks (a striking
current example is the telecommunications industry). Because ultimately only a few
firms can win, the losers in an industry shake-out will not see a return on their invest-
ments unless the winners buy up their equipment and client database. Furthermore, high
expectations of profit can prompt owners of resources that are strategic for exploiting
network effects to siphon off profits not yet realized (example: the state auctions of the
UMTS licenses in the cellular phone industry). Second, one drawback of the IT revolu-
tion is that it facilitates the imitation of innovations (Leonhardt 2000). Although imita-
tion leads to a more rapid distribution of productivity effects and is thus desirable for the
economy at large, it diminishes pioneer rents. Third, the model’s inflation-fighting ex-
change rate policy can have a negative impact on profits, as the appreciation of the home
currency cheapens the products of the foreign competition, not just basic products but
complex ones as well (the traditional trade surplus in high-tech goods is expected to
vanish for 2000; Lenz 2000: 5-2). The goal of price stability can thus run counter to
profit targets. Given the interaction of these three factors, if profit expectations were not
realized after a certain amount of time, then an investment slowdown would occur in
this model. Hence a slump could not be ruled out. Considering the importance of asset
price increases in this model, even a cyclical amplification effect might result.
The wealth-profit nexus: The new economy model presumes that market valuation of
productive capital is closely related to the profit expectations of firms. Rising profits
would lead to rising share values on the stock exchange and thus to capital gains among
investors. This might hold true in the long term, but as countless studies have showed,
the promise of market profits, not just dividends, is one of the major incentives to par-
ticipate in the stock market. Thus every investment decision entails an estimation not
only of one’s own profit chances but also of the prospects of the other market partici-
pants. Rational decisions of the individual can turn into irrational behavior of the masses
(for more on stock market fever – or, in Greenspan’s words, “irrational exuberance” – in
recent years, see Shiller 2000). Such stock exchange speculation in the era of global
capital markets can be augmented by exchange rate speculation. For foreign investors,
the profitability of an investment object in relation to exchange rate fluctuations can be
negligible (in search of safe investment opportunities following the devaluation of the
Yen in 1995 and the Asian crisis, foreign investors thronged the U.S. stock exchange,
buying about 30% of all stocks in the first half of 2000; Brenner 2000: 28). All in all, for
systematic reasons cyclical fluctuations of market valuations have to be reckoned with,
which in the event of a bear market can have a negative effect on the wealth-
consumption nexus.
The wealth-consumption nexus: The hypothesis that capital gains stimulate consumer
spending also is founded upon many presuppositions. In his presentation of the neoclas-
sical growth syllogism, Bluestone points out that rising equity prices do not create real
income flows but merely enhance share values. Rather, rising equity prices would
mostly have just psychological effects on the durable goods sector. Significant psycho-
logical effects come into play only when equity prices skyrocket and further increases
are seen to be likely. Moreover, capital is disproportionately in the hands of the richest
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households, which tend to have a very high savings rate. An increase in the level of
spending would therefore require an explosive and continuous rise in equity prices
(1999: 34).5 The investment-profit nexus discussed above challenges such rises, even
given a functioning wealth-profit nexus.
The contingencies of these three nexuses increase the likelihood of cyclical fluctuations
in the new economy model. Indeed, in 2000 all three of these linkages malfunctioned. In
the investment-profit nexus, the “dot.com” firms along with a wide spectrum of listed
businesses disappointed the profit expectations of financial analysts (for Standard &
Poor’s 500 businesses, profit expectations for the fourth quarter of 2000 had to be re-
duced from 15.4% to 4.2%; Fuerbringer 2001). In the wealth-profit nexus, equity prices
went into a free fall (from September until late December the index of the technology
exchange NASDAQ fell by 45%). The ensuing depreciation put a brake on consumer
spending, particularly in wealthier households (Uchitelle 2000b).
This cyclical decline was triggered in part by interest rate increases by the Federal Re-
serve beginning in mid-1999. The interest rate was raised to 6.5% in the face of new
risks of inflation presented by rapid economic growth exceeding productivity gains on
the one hand and limited elasticity of the raw materials markets on the other (FRB 1999;
oil prices doubled from mid-1999 to mid-2000, BOC 2000). These developments indi-
cate that, due to the “irrational exuberance” of stock exchanges, the risk of cyclical
overheating has not been eradicated in the new economy. Furthermore, in spite of the IT
revolution, the new economy revealed that it too is dependent on the cheap supply of
raw materials.
Business cycles however do not challenge the basic validity of a growth model; they
attracted attention even in the “golden” years of Fordism. The real question is whether
the growth model possesses automatic or at least discretionary stabilizers. In Robert
Boyer’s finance-led growth model, the Federal Reserve functions as controller; in addi-
tion to fighting inflation it must stabilize stock exchange prices through interest rate
policy and supply of liquidity (2000b: 131f.). In the growth model presented here based
on a new production paradigm, the Federal Reserve is assigned the additional task of
stabilizing investment volume. In the event of extensive investment failures, the Federal
Reserve would have to lower interest rates in order to provide wary investors with an
incentive to take additional investment risks. In a slump, the Federal Reserve would also
have to counteract deflationary trends that threaten to develop due to the lack of a col-
lective wage agreement linking nominal wages to productivity gains.
Thin Empirical Basis for Evaluating the New Economy Theory
Yet the central assumption of the regulation theoretical interpretation of the new econ-
omy – high productivity by virtue of a new production paradigm – is built upon dubious
empirical foundations. As already mentioned, official statistics disclose no significantly
accelerated growth outside the information technology industries. A study by the De-
                                                
5 Karen E. Dynan and Dean M. Maki (2001) from the Federal Reserve Board have estimated that “an
additional dollar of wealth leads households with moderate securities holdings to increase consump-
tion between 5 cents and 15 cents, with the most likely gain in the lower part of this range.”
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partment of Commerce showed that in the IT-intensive service sectors, labor productiv-
ity even declined by 0.3% between 1990 and 1997 (DOC 2000: 39f). According to re-
nowned journalist Bob Woodward, these data were known to Alan Greenspan when he
formulated the new economy theory. Because of an anomaly in the relation between the
inflation rate and profit trends, Greenspan concluded that the official statistics underre-
ported productivity trends. In 1994 and 1995, business profits soared while inflation and
wages remained constant. This difference could only be explained by increased produc-
tivity (Woodward 2000: 173).
The informational value of the official statistics is indeed limited. The service sectors
now make up well over half of the gross domestic product of the United States. Yet
there is still no universally accepted method for measuring productivity in the service
sectors. And well over half of all services are categorized as hard to measure. These
include education, healthcare, and the broad FIRE sector (financial services, insurance,
and real estate; Griliches 1995). If the official statistics were to take sales as output
measure, then in the hypothetical example of lower insurance rates, declining produc-
tivity would be assumed even though the rate reduction might be due to increased
managerial productivity. For this reason, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis takes
hours worked as output measure for most of these sectors. However, this leads to pro-
ductivity growth largely being equated with wage increases (Dean 1999).6 In addition,
the utilization of information technology can enhance the efficiency of unpaid rather
than paid labor (e.g., faster research possibilities for library users), which is not reflected
in the output figures (Huws 2000: 655).
In October 1999, the Bureau of Labor Statistics adopted a new method for measuring
productivity in the banking industry that takes transactions as output measure. As a re-
sult, high gains in labor productivity were disclosed. Nevertheless, this calls attention to
the weighting of the disparate transactions, which range from account entries to complex
consultancy services (DOC 2000: 69).
At the instance of Alan Greenspan, a multiplicity of studies have investigated the prob-
lem of productivity measurement in individual service industries. They verified that
measurement errors led to an underestimation of real productivity trends. Yet there is no
consensus regarding the extent of underestimation (Dean 1999).
The measurement of productivity in the manufacturing sector is also problematic be-
cause of the inherent difficulty of relating a physical entity (labor hour) to a monetary
entity (value added). For example, neither the utility of rapid product innovation (which
retards productivity due to lower returns to scale) nor product improvement is ade-
quately taken into account. Nevertheless, any attempt to measure qualitative improve-
ment is prone to arbitrariness. The Bureau of Economic Analysis developed a “hedonic”
price index for the computer and semiconductor industries that reflects changes in the
                                                
6 “BEA [Bureau of Economic Analysis, Dept. of Commerce] estimates the real GPO [Gross Product] of
[water transportation, transportation services, depository institutions, nondepository institutions,
holding and investment offices] by ‘extrapolation’ based on ‘BEA persons engaged in production’
and the GPO of [business services, insurance agents, legal services, motion pictures, and health serv-
ices] based on ‘BLS [Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dept. of Labor] employment weighted by Census
Bureau receipts.’ BEA uses separate deflators for outputs and inputs (‘double deflation’) for the re-
maining four industries.” (DOC 2000: 40)
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price-performance ratio. But while in the computer industry high computing speed is a
factor in determining labor productivity, in the automobile industry the maximum speed
of the manufactured automobiles is not taken into consideration. The development of a
“hedonic” price index thus runs the risk of being hijacked by special interests. Interest-
ingly, the price index for the computer industry was developed jointly with a team from
IBM (Cole et al. 1986).
Whether productivity advances determined by firm-level analyses in the auto and steel
industries can really be attributed to IT use is still unresolved. The significant edge in
productivity enjoyed by Japanese producers in the 1980s did not rest on a higher share
of information technologies (unless one counts the index-card-based Kanban system)
but on the now universally known principles of lean production and high levels of ca-
pacity utilization (Jürgens et al. 1989; Scherrer 1992). Seen from this perspective, the
positive productivity trend of the old economy came about by imitating Japan’s technol-
ogy on the one hand and, thanks to the favorable macroeconomic climate, its higher ca-
pacity utilization rates on the other. It is worth noting that 30% of the automobiles pro-
duced in the United States today are overseen by Japanese managers.
In light of these measurement problems, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s study
“Digital Economy 2000,” despite an overall positive assessment of the new economy
theory, came to the cautious estimate:
“In the absence of more accurate measures of output for IT-intensive services indus-
tries, we cannot rule out the possibility that IT has made a very modest contribution
to labor productivity outside the IT producing sector itself.” (DOC 2000: 69)
The critique of the new economy theory stands however on the same weak empirical
foundation. Robert Gordon’s attempt to empirically disprove this theory is based on
official productivity statistics plagued with measurement errors. Furthermore, his ap-
proach to disproving the theory of a spillover effect is unconvincing. In his regression
analysis of the interval 1994 to 1999, Gordon employs a cyclical effect beyond the pre-
vious trend to explain the productivity gains in the private sector including the computer
industry. Yet the trend alone is sufficient for explaining productivity growth in the pri-
vate sector excluding the computer industry. Gordon concludes therefore that the use of
computers outside the computer industry would not have led to any productivity gains
surpassing the trend (Gordon 2000: 16). Irrespective of the problems in measuring pro-
ductivity growth, Gordon’s inference is questionable in so far as it is unknown whether
the so-called trend in the examined time interval would have been sustained without the
use of computers. Moreover, the data are likewise incomplete as regards the geographi-
cal and sectoral distribution of computer investments (Haltiwanger/Jarmin 2000: 7).
Nevertheless, the productivity decline in the first quarter of 2001 (seasonally adjusted
annual rate of -0.1 percent in the nonfarm business sector, BLS 2001) at a time of slow
growth suggests that the previous productivity increases can be largely explained by
strong output growth.
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Alternative Macro-Explanation: Externally Financed Consumer
Boom
In view of the thin empirical basis of the new economy theory, alternative explanations
are equally plausible. Robert Brenner (2000) acknowledges the significance of produc-
tivity gains but assigns a central position to marked profit increases. Trevor Evans puts
forward the theory of growth-oriented monetary policy (2001). This states that U.S.
monetary policy has behaved anti-cyclically since the mid-1980s with but a brief inter-
ruption. European monetary policy, by contrast, was not only more restrictive but also
pro-cyclical. Accompanied by a pro-cyclically biased fiscal policy, European monetary
policy would have led to a markedly higher interest rate level and hence to a higher
jobless rate (cf. Palley 1999, Flassbeck 2000).
I find Evans’s argument to be very convincing and have nothing to add apart from a few
thoughts concerning the extent to which U.S. monetary policy of the 1990s may be gen-
eralized. Prior to the introduction of the Euro, the more restrictive policy in Europe was
primarily a consequence of the globalization of economic activities. National currencies
competed against each other for the funds of international wealth holder; lower real in-
terest rates would have been penalized by monies/capital being withdrawn (Herr/Voy
1989). Conversely, the United States’ liberal monetary policy benefited from the glob-
alization of goods and capital markets. The extensively liberalized trade kept inflation
under control, specifically by a reduction in import prices (6.4% per annum from the
third quarter of 1995 to the first quarter of 1999; 70% of the decline was effectuated by
non-oil commodities; Rich/Rissmiller 2000: footnote 7), by competitive pressure, and
by the provision of additional production capacities to prevent shortages (an argument
shared by Greenspan [2000]). The low inflation rate gave the Federal Reserve leeway
for interest rate policymaking to promote growth. The downside of opening the home
market was expanding trade deficits, which for 2000 are estimated at over 450 billion
dollars, making up 4% of GNP (Bureau of Economic Analysis/U.S. Census, January 2,
2001). These inflation-dampening trade deficits are financed by liberalized capital mar-
kets. In the first quarter of 2000, “overseas” financed 4% of the United States’ GNP
(Peach/Steindel 2000: 3).
This willingness of foreign wealth holders to finance the American boom is a major
reason for why that boom may be termed an American phenomena (cf. Boyer 2000b:
143). No other country with all its economic actors enjoys such a high degree of trust
among international wealth holders in its debt-paying ability as does the United States.
Despite the herd mentality of capital market players, there are also objective reasons for
this: there is no need to raise foreign currency (the economic actors of the United States
are indebted in their own currency) and the size of the American market promises high
liquidity (and, in case of need, a quick market exit). Yet, as the past has showed, this
trust is not boundless. The years 1971-1973, 1979, and 1985 bore witness to massive
capital outflows, which caused a drastic devaluation of the dollar (Scherrer 1999: 185-
234). For this reason, American monetary and currency policymakers were disquieted
about the rising current account deficits, their faith in the new economy notwithstand-
ing. A flight of international capitalists out of the dollar and the dollar’s concomitant
depreciation would cause rapid import price hikes, accelerate currency devaluation, and
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raise calls for a hard line in interest rate policy: The downturn would arrive (Bergsten
2000).
There would be fewer grounds for worry if the foreign debt were indeed counteracted by
explosive investment activity. Seen historically, the investment rate of recent years is
not very high (16.1% of GNP in 1998 vis-à-vis 16.7% in 1980) and is below the Euro-
pean rate (18.5% in 1998; Pitz 2000: chart 4). Interestingly, after the U.S. national ac-
counts reclassified software expenditures as an investment good in 1999, the investment
rate rose dramatically that year – by 149 billion dollars (DOC 2000: 67). The increased
investments are moreover offset by higher rates of depreciation. In the 1960s, the gross
domestic product (GDP) and the net domestic product (GDP less depreciation; NDP)
rose in sync by 4.4% per annum. In 1999 the GDP increased by 4.1%, while the NDP
rose by merely 3.6% (ibid.). Since the investment volume had not risen vis-à-vis the
1980s, foreign countries probably financed consumption rather than investments in re-
cent years.
The theory of a consumption-driven expansion in spite of high investments in IT cannot
be dismissed, especially considering that the savings rate of private households has
dropped drastically. In August 2000 the savings rate hit a record low of –0.4% (Pitz
2000: 5). Richard Peach and Charles Steindel calculated that, if realized capital gains
and the taxes thereon were taken into account, the 1999 savings rate would be 7.25 per-
centage points higher. But they admit that the bulk of these gains would be reaped by
just a handful of households (Peach/Steindel 2000; see figure 6). These imagined sce-
narios were nonetheless of little use in 2000, when on average the stock market gener-
ated no capital gains. In the instance of an economic downturn, not even the American
government, which “saved” an astonishing 5.1% of the GNP in 1999 (ibid. 3), will be
able to compensate for the lack of household savings. Consequently, one would expect
rising dependence on foreign investors, which financed about 4% of the GNP in 1999
(ibid.). According to Robert Brenner, such dependence places the Federal Reserve in a
policymaking quandary. Lowering interest rates would sustain expansion, but raising
them would ensure future foreign capital flows (Brenner 2000: 43). At present, the Fed-
Fig. 6: Adjusted Personal Savings Rate 1983-1999
0
4
8
12
16
1983 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99
Saving rate incl. realized capital gains
Saving rate excluding
taxes on capital gainsNIPA personal saving
rate
Source: Peach/Steindel (2000: 4)
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eral Reserve under Greenspan seems to hope that interest rate cuts will stimulate the
stock market and the United States will therefore remain attractive to investors. The
proposed tax cut by President George Bush should also help to achieve this goal. But
whether this calculation will bear fruit in the long run depends not least on future busi-
ness profits, which in turn are affected by future productivity gains (Board of Governors
2001).
The New Economy Awaits Its Real Test
In light of the impressive U.S. business cycle of recent years, the theory of a new econ-
omy, which makes non-inflationary high growth possible thanks to high productivity
gains, is winning plausibility. Explanations for this can be found in mainstream eco-
nomic theory as well as in regulation theory. However, some basic causal relationships
of such a regime, especially the investment-profits, wealth-profits, and wealth-con-
sumption connections, seem too fragile to be able to support the assertion that a stable
new regime of accumulation has emerged. In particular, it cannot be safely assumed that
outlays in machinery and equipment for the new production paradigm increase both
productivity and profits. For systematic reasons market valuations do not always reflect
profitability. In a wealth driven consumption world, an increase in the level of spending
would require an explosive and – most unrealistically – a continuous rise in equity
prices. Moreover, the heart of the new economy theory – IT-related productivity gains –
is founded on controversial data. A large portion of economic activities, especially
services, is hard to measure. And even in the IT-producing sphere, a scientifically con-
tentious “hedonic” price index is the prerequisite for statistically proving high produc-
tivity growth. Furthermore, the previous official growth statistics are lower than that of
the “golden” era, the 1960s.
In view of this lasting doubt at the heart of the new economy principle, the theory of the
specific globalization form of the U.S. economy appears just as plausible. According to
this theory, globalization in the form of extensively liberalized trade in goods keeps in-
flation under control. The liberalized financial markets on their part make funds avail-
able for investments and for inflation-curbing current account deficits. Herein lies the
uniqueness of the American boom, as no other country enjoys such a high level of trust
on the part of international wealth holders in its debt-paying ability. Yet this trust has its
limits. Consistent with this theory, a flight of international capitalists out of the dollar
and the dollar’s concomitant devaluation would give rise to restrictive interest rate pol-
icy measures.
I am currently at a loss to decide whether the new economy is indeed a new accumula-
tion regime or merely a pompous construct for what is really a short-term trend. The
only thing that appears certain is that the American boom of recent years has benefited
decisively from exogenous conditions and therefore resists generalization. Future re-
search should not only aim at better statistical measurement of productivity trends but
also at improved analytical and empirical means to differentiate the effects of a possible
new economy from those of specific globalization forms of the U.S. economy. The cur-
rent probation period of the new economy in the light of sagging business profits and
high current account deficits could soon deliver valuable empirical data for this research.
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